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High Tech Monitoring Versus Privacy in the Workplace 
in the Law and Case Law of the Czech Republic
Abstract: Modern technologies ask anew the old question about how employees can be checked during 
working hours so that legitimate interests of their employers are safeguarded. Th e answer cannot be so-
lely technological, as the employees right to privacy, even in the workplace, is protected at the highest 
constitutional as well as international levels. Employers when defending their rights and interest are 
therefore far from free to use the potential of available technological devices in full and without limits. 
To strike the right balance between legitimate interests and fundamental rights is by no means easy, as 
the present text tries to demonstrate by summarizing and analyzing the existing Czech approach to the 
issue. On the one hand, Czech law on the protection of privacy of employees in the workplace, as well 
as the authorities applying it, are principally in line with generally accepted European standards. On the 
other hand, however, this basic consensus on values and their substantive and procedural legal safegu-
ards does not mean that Czech law currently answers all questions and leads employers safely outside 
the restricted zone of prohibited ways of employee monitoring. Th e focus of the text is thus directed at 
those provisions of legal acts, decisions of the highest courts, opinions of supervisory authorities and 
arguments of commentators that infl uence the way in which the aforementioned rights and interest are 
balanced in the current Czech legal practice.
Keywords: privacy in the workplace, monitoring of employees, information technologies, tracking and 
recording, Labor Code, proportionality, fundamental rights
1. Introduction
Technological advances have a huge impact on the defi nition of privacy and on 
diff erent aspects of its protection. In connection with this, they infl uence also the 
solution to the old question of how to combine the interests and rights of the employer 
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with the interests and rights of its employees.1 On the one side, new technologies 
permit the supervision of employees with an unprecedented easiness. Every touch 
of a keyboard, every change in expression of a human face, simply every move of 
each employee can be monitored. Hired staff  can thus be checked and disciplined 
during working hours much more eff ectively but also much more intrusively in terms 
of their privacy. On the other hand, the same information technologies make it also 
easier for employees to communicate in their private interests during working hours, 
which means abuse of the equipment provided by their employer (PCs, smartphones, 
cars, scanners, copy machines etc.) or even to collect and share electronic data to the 
detriment of the employer. 
Abuse of sophisticated information technologies can therefore infringe 
both legitimate interests and fundamental rights on each side of the employment 
relationship. Employers have rights to control performance of their employees and 
to protect their ownership against the abusive behavior of employees. Th e latter from 
their side have a legitimate interest and right not to give away their personal privacy 
and data that may easily fall victim to invasive techniques of monitoring and control 
put in place by their employers. In short, the subject matter here is the employer´s 
ownership versus the employee’s privacy2 in our epoch of digital economy. Neither of 
these highly protected values can be plainly sacrifi ced to the other and the constant 
careful balancing of opposite legitimate interests and fundamental rights is therefore 
necessary. 
To strike the right balance is, however, by no means easy, as will be demonstrated 
in the following text that tries to summarize and analyze the recent Czech approach to 
the issue. To familiarize the reader with a prevailing situation, it can be noted that in 
the year 2017 the State Labor Inspectorate (hereinaft er SUIP) found a violation of the 
law in the monitoring of employees by cameras in 80% of the companies controlled. 
Of the 75 inspections in total, 58 were positive in that there was an inadmissible 
interference with employee privacy.3 Th ere is obviously room for improvement, at 
least in the everyday practice of employer - employee relationships. Th e present 
analysis wants to contribute to this goal by showing how the balance between the 
employer´s ownership and the employee’s privacy right is perceived in Czech law, 
1 Th e statement that “Th e history of privacy is deeply intertwinned with the history of technology” 
is a truism, whose validity is well proven by the facts of history. Th e right to privacy as such was 
fi rst formulated in the US at the end of the 19th century as a reaction to the rise of tabloids and 
instantaneous photography. No wonder that ICTs and their penetration of our everyday life have 
opened new perspectives on the issue. See U. Grasser, Law, Privacy & Technology. Commentary 
series, “Harvard Law Review Forum” 2016, vol. 130(2), pp. 61-62. 
2 L.  Ticháčková, Vlastnictví zaměstnavatele versus soukromí zaměstnance, “EPRAVO.CZ 
magazine” 2016, No. 1. 
3 K.  Kolářová, Většina stížností na nepřiměřené sledování v práci je oprávněná, “Česká pozice”, 
8.12.2017.
55
High Tech Monitoring Versus Privacy in the Workplace in the Law and Case Law...
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze 2019 vol. 24 nr 2
by Czech legal commentators, and most of all, in the decisions of the Czech courts, 
namely the highest judicial institutions of the country. 
For this purpose, the content of the relevant legislation will be analyzed fi rst, 
then the focus will turn to the key concepts such as privacy, proportionality of 
intervention, consent to monitoring etc., and in the last part attention will be paid 
to specifi c monitoring methods (checking of emails, telephone calls etc.) and their 
legal consequences. As the Czech courts have not yet had the occasion to interpret all 
aspects of the issue, the view of experts on what is permissible in the workplace will 
be added to this (kind of in-country) report. A summary of the fi ndings will be then 
provided in the conclusion. 
2. Th e applicable legislation 
Th ere is no need to stress that the Czech Republic, due to its international 
engagements and memberships, has to follow the guidance provided by the UN4 and 
Council of Europe conventions5, the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions6 and 
the European Union standards of fundamental rights and personal data protection.7 
However, as this outer framework is constantly evolving with each new case decision 
or piece of legislation (recently the GDPR) and as new controversial moments keep 
emerging from everyday practice, there is undoubtedly a space for a country specifi c 
search for answers in a number of situations. Th is study will therefore not discuss 
every legal provision that may become relevant when employee privacy rights 
clash with the employer´s property rights but will focus on the key pieces of Czech 
legislation and the case law that interpret them. 
Th e constitutional order of the country, namely its Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms,8 quite naturally provides for the protection of basic rights of 
both employers and employees. Property rights of owners are enshrined in Article 
11. Article 7 guarantees the inviolability of the person and their privacy. Article 10 
protects everyone from any unauthorized intrusion into his or her private and family 
4 Th e International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 17(1).
5 Th e Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinaft er 
Convetion), Article 8. 
6 See for details: European Court of Human Rights, Guide on article 8 of the European Conventipon 
of Human Rights – Right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. Council 
of Europe, August 2018. https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf (accessed 
31.10.2018).
7 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Arts. 7, 8. For the overview of the EU secondary law in the 
area see Online Privacy Law: European Union. Library of Congress, report updated on 29. 05. 
2018. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/online-privacy-law/2017/eu.php (accessed 31.10.2018).
8 Constitutional act No. 2/1993 Coll. as amended by constitutional act No. 162/1998 Coll. For 
English translation see https://www.usoud.cz/fi leadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/
Pravni_uprava/AJ/Listina_English_version.pdf (accessed 31.10.2018).
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life as well as from the unauthorized misuse of personal data. Finally, Article  13 
protects the confi dentiality of letters and communications sent by telephone, 
telegraph, or by other similar devices. Th e law of the highest legal force thus protects 
the rights on both sides of the potential confl ict. However Articles 7, 11 and 13 of the 
Charter permit that rights protected by them are in practice limited “in the cases and 
in the manner designated by law”. 
Th is specifi c law is not a lex specialis in the sense of legislation governing, for 
example, the use of CCTV systems or other specifi c means of interfering with privacy, 
or, as the case may be, of specifi c regulations concerning the direct intervention of 
employers in the privacy of employees. Such specialized regulations do not exist in 
the Czech Republic. Concrete legislation should therefore be sought in the provisions 
governing private law, labor relations and (where employees data are processed) the 
protection of personal data in general. 
Th e key private law act, the Civil Code (Act No. 89/2012 Coll.) aff ects all 
relations of a private nature, including labor-law aff airs, and its Division 6 regulates 
the “personality rights of an individual” (namely in Sections 81-90). Regarding the 
protection of privacy in the workplace the Civil Code however is of a subsidiarity use, 
being merely a lex generalis to the Labor Code (Act No. 262/2006 Coll.).9 Chapter 
VIII of Labor Code, dedicated to the “protection of an employer’s property interests 
and protection of an employee’s personal rights”, contains just one Section (§ 316). 
Th is Section will be thoroughly analyzed in the following pages as it is the provision 
that shapes the relationship between the protection of employer´s ownership and the 
employee’s privacy. 
In the overview of statutory acts aff ecting the “monitoring at the workplace” cases, 
one cannot forget the public law lex specialis, which up to 25 May 2018 was primarily 
the Personal Data Protection Act (Act No. 101/2000 Coll.). It has been replaced by the 
EU´s GDPR10 together with the local Personal Data Processing Act (not yet approved 
in November 2018) which is to accompany the GDPR into practice in the Czech 
Republic. Th is piece of regulation establishes and governs operations of the Offi  ce for 
Personal Data Protection (UOOU), the administrative body that regulates the rights 
and obligations in processing of personal data, i.e. when employees are monitored 
with recordings, which are then stored, categorized, transferred etc. Finally, yet 
importantly, there is also the Czech Criminal Code (Act No. 40/2009 Coll.) which in 
its Section 182 sanctions the breach of secrecy of correspondence (which includes not 
9 Labor Code No. 262/2006 Coll., as amended. For English translation see https://www.mpsv.cz/
fi les/clanky/3221/Labour_Code_2012.pdf (accessed 31.10.2018). 
10 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
(O.J. L 119, 4.05.2016, pp. 1-88). 
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only letters, but also data, text, voice, audio or visual messages sent by the means of 
a network of electronic communication and computer systems) with imprisonment 
for up to two years or with prohibition of activity. 
Th us, the above-mentioned monitoring of employees in the workplace 
may fall under the two key laws, namely the Labor Code (hereinaft er LC) and, at 
the same time, GDPR plus the future Personal Data Processing Act (and ultima 
ratio also the Criminal Code). Th e case may be, however, that only one of the two 
regulations would be applicable. Th ere may exist two diff erent sets of cases, one of 
which involves only interference with privacy (if it occurs without data processing 
enabling the identifi cation of a particular natural person) and the other contains 
only the processing of personal data (if they can be obtained without interfering with 
the privacy of an employee). However, both sets of cases would in practice rather 
overlap - data allowing the identifi cation of a natural person are oft en obtained by 
the intervention into privacy and are then usually stored, sorted, evaluated, etc. Due 
to the ongoing expansion of the concepts of “privacy” and “personal data”, it is thus 
inevitable that the same case of monitoring oft en leads to application of the two 
regulations and is then subject to supervision (and eventually to sanction) by two 
administrative authorities. Th e Labor Inspection Offi  ce (SUIP) deals with violation of 
employee privacy, while the failure to fulfi ll the obligations related to the processing 
of personal data is supervised by the Offi  ce for Personal Data Protection (UOOU).11 
In addition, brutal breaches of correspondence secrecy should naturally be seized 
upon by the competent authorities involved in criminal proceedings (however this 
option will be left  aside in the following analysis). 
Th is double regulation in practice poses considerable problems, as it is evidenced 
by online discussions and instructions on numerous internet sites trying to explain 
to stakeholders how the rights should be protected and obligations complied with.12 
Employers must be mindful of the fact that, for example, the system of registering 
entry to and exit from the workplace would entail the processing of personal data, but 
not, as a matter of principle, a violation of privacy. On the other hand, an installation 
of CCTV cameras in the workplace, with no recordings, would amount to a privacy 
11 SUIP states on its offi  cial website the following: “Control of the above mentioned (i.e. monitoring 
of employees in the workplace using a camera based surveillance system – added by author) falls 
within the competence of labor inspectorates. If a breach of Section 316(2) of the Labor Code 
is detected in connection with the processing of personal data of employees (i.e. when camera 
recordings would be archived and would allow for the identifi cation of employees), the fi ndings 
will also be transmitted to the Offi  ce for Personal Data Protection”; http://www.suip.cz/otazky-
a-odpovedi/pracovnepravni-vztahy/ochrana-majetkovych-zajmu-zamestnavatele-a-ochrana-
osobnich-prav-zamestnance/monitorovani-zamestnancu-na-pracovisti-kamerovym-systemem/ 
(accessed 31.10.2018). 
12 See for instance in E. Janečková, V. Bartík, Ochrana osobních údajů v pracovním právu (Otázky 
a odpovědi), Wolters Kluwer, Praha 2016, pp. 128, 131.
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breach, but not to the processing of personal data. Since the aim of the study is to 
analyze the legal aspect of the protection of privacy in the workplace in the Czech 
Republic, the issues discussed below will be viewed primarily through the lenses of 
the Labor Code and its Section 316. Only where privacy issues cross with personal 
data protection and such situation would cause interpretive or application ambiguity 
will related data protection requirements be given attention. 
3. Section 316 of Labor Code – a guidance or a puzzle? 
Th e fact that Chapter VIII LC titled “Protection of an employer’s property 
interests and protection of an employee’s personal rights” contains just one section, 
Section 316, might suggest that it is a unifi ed and coherent set of rules. In reality, 
however, this Section regulates diff erent situations that for the sake of clarity would 
be better split into separate sections. Paragraphs 1-3 really focus on the checks 
conducted by the employer in the workplace.13 Paragraph 4, on the other hand, 
prohibits employers to require from their employees information that does not 
“directly relate to work performance and basic labor relationship” (e.g. to question 
them about pregnancy, sexual orientation, political adherence etc.). However, even 
within paras 1-3 of the Section, the diff erence between paragraph 1 (which allows 
the employer to check that employees do not misuse his “means of production or 
service” without due consent and for their own purposes) and paragraphs 2 and 3 
(which prohibit the employer from encroaching upon his employees’ privacy without 
a serious cause) should be duly noted.
Paragraph 1 does not mention employee privacy and uses the term “to check” in 
order to empower the employer to oversee that his means of production or service 
etc. are not misused by employees. A proportionate way of conducting such a check 
is required, but the law sets no specifi c conditions for that. On the other hand, 
paragraphs 2 and 3 deal with the employee’s right to privacy that may be encroached 
upon by employer´s surveillance (monitoring), interception (recording) of telephone 
13 Section 316 (translation taken from op.cit. n. 9): (1) Without their employer’s consent, employees 
may not use the employer’s means of production or service and other means necessary for 
performance of their work, including computers and telecommunication technology for their 
personal needs. Th e employer is authorized to check compliance with the prohibition laid down 
in the fi rst sentence in an appropriate way. (2) Without a serious cause deriving from the nature 
of the employer’s activity, the employer may not encroach upon employees’ privacy at workplaces 
and in the employer’s common premises by open or concealed surveillance (monitoring) of 
employees, interception (including recording) of their telephone calls, checking their electronic 
mail or postal consignments addressed to a certain employee. (3) Where there is a serious cause 
on the employer’s side consisting in the nature of his activity which justifi es the introduction of 
surveillance (monitoring) under subsection (2), the employer shall directly inform the employees 
of the scope and methods of its implementation.
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calls, checking of electronic mail etc. An employer can do this only if he has a serious 
cause deriving from the nature of his activity and if he has directly informed 
employees of the scope and methods of his monitoring, checking etc. 
Even though the terms “to check”, “to survey”, “to monitor” used in these 
paragraphs may sound like synonyms, they are not in the context of Section 316 
LC. Otherwise, it would be diffi  cult to tell how an ordinary employer may routinely 
have use of paragraph 1, without being prohibited from doing so by the condition 
set in paragraph 2, which authorizes the monitoring of employees only if a non-
ordinary nature of activity provides a serious cause for it. Th e commentary literature 
has therefore shown the senselessness of understanding paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of 
Section 316 as rules regulating the same situation. If there were one rule expressed 
in 3 paragraphs, the right to check employees would only be given to an employer 
carrying out a particularly dangerous or threatening activity.14 To avoid that, both 
parts of Section 316 need to be read separately. More precisely, paragraphs 2-3 need 
to be understood as setting the rules for special situations (interference with the 
privacy of employees if a specifi c cause so requires), whereas ordinary control by 
the employer takes place in accordance with paragraph 1.15 In the existing wording, 
however, Section 316 LC remains rather “incomprehensible and meaningless, 
especially for the employer, whose legal certainty it undermines”.16 Unfortunately, 
even the Czech courts and administrative authorities do not produce in their 
decisions and statements any clear and easy-to-understand guidelines. 
Th e Czech Supreme Court (hereinaft er SC) and the Czech Supreme 
Administrative Court (hereinaft er SAC)17 standardly interpret the distinction 
between paragraph 1 and paragraphs 2-3 of Section 316 LC so that paragraph 1 
is devoted to the protection of the employer’s property while paragraphs 2-3 are 
dedicated to the protection of the privacy of the employee.18 Under paragraph 1, 
every employer is entitled, to the extent of what is necessary and proportionate, to 
check his employees. It must be done without any interference with privacy greater 
than that given by the relationship of subordination between the employer and the 
14 See for instance M.  Štefk o, Soukromí zaměstnanců pod ochranou inspelce práce, “Acta 
Universitatis Brunensis Iuridica” 2018, vol. 604; also M.  Hromanda, Ochrana osobnosti 
zaměstnance při elektronické komunikaci, (in:) H. Barancová, A. Olšovská (eds.), Pracovné parvo 
v digitálnej dobe, Leges, Praha 2017, p. 166.
15 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court on the case 5 As 158/2012 – 52 (23.03.2013). Th e 
Court stated: “Th e employer has the right to proportionate control according to the provisions of 
Section 316 (1) of the Labor Code while the provisions of Section 316 (2) of the Labor Code are 
corrective of possible ways of performing such control”.
16 J. Morávek, Kontrola a sledování zaměstnanců, “Právní rozhledy” 2017, No. 12.
17 Th e Supreme Court is the last instance for disputes between employees and employers, the 
Supreme Administrative Court for disputes of employers with supervisory state authorities.
18 Judgment of the Supreme Court on the case 2 Cdo 747/2013 (7.08.2014); Judgment of the 
Supreme Administrative Court on the case 5 As 158/2012 – 52 (23.03.2013). 
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employee and by the fact that each manager has to supervise his subordinates (which 
naturally limits the extension of their privacy). Without need to comply with other 
conditions, each employer is thus authorized to check whether his employees use 
the entrusted means of production or service solely to perform the entrusted work, 
properly manage them, guard and protect them from damage, loss, destruction or 
misuse and do not act in contradiction with the legitimate interests of the employer. 
Th erefore, the “checking” under paragraph 1 is fundamentally and qualitatively 
diff erent from “monitoring or surveillance” according to paragraphs 2-3 of the same 
Section: it can be carried out under all circumstances and, if appropriate, it is not 
subject to the restrictions contained in paras 2-3 because it does not intervene into 
employees’ privacy. It looks as if Section 316(1) LC creates a safe harbor for Czech 
employers and the only question that must be answered is how to stay safely within 
its limits. 
On this issue, the SC ruled in 2012 in the most cited Czech case of an employer´s 
control over the activity of an employee on the Internet.19 Th e employer found that 
his employee had spent 102.97 hours out of 168 working hours in a single month by 
viewing non-job-related content on the Internet (always using a work PC). As a result, 
the employment relationship was immediately terminated for a particularly gross 
breach of duty because the employer did not consent to the use of his equipment for 
the private purposes of the employee. A series of litigation followed, as the evidence, 
in the form of a list of web pages with non-work content visited by the employee, was 
produced without the employee’s consent and knowledge. Czech courts, including 
the SC, and ultimately also the Constitutional Court,20 found that in this case, there 
had been no unacceptable interference with privacy of the employee and hence no act 
of the employer that exceeded the authorization given to him under Section 316(1) 
LC. 
According to the SC, the employer with his checking did not fall under Section 
316 (2-3) LC, as the degree of interference with the complainant’s privacy was, in the 
opinion of the judges, totally negligible (if any at all). Th e fact that the employer’s 
control fell exclusively within the scope of the authorization given in Section 316 (1) 
LC was explained by the SC as follows: 
 – fi rst, the Court found that the employer had not proceeded “completely 
arbitrarily (in terms of scope, length, thoroughness, etc.)” and checked in 
a proportionate way, because the content of the websites visited (and what 
exactly the employee was searching for, watched, etc.) was not detected. Th e 
employer only ascertained whether the pages visited were job related;
19 Judgment of the Supreme Court on the case 21 Cdo 1771/2011 (16.08.2012).
20 Resolution of the Constitutional Court no. I. ÚS 3933/12 (7.11.2012) stated that the constituional 
complaint of the employee was manifestly unfounded. 
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 – second, the SC considered it essential that the employer did not use 
wiretapping, telephone call logging, e-mail monitoring, or mail order 
inspection (the forms of employee monitoring explicitly mentioned in 
Section 316(2-3) LC), but he reviewed only a statement of the PC’s activity 
conducted with the employee’s login.21 
Th e fulfi llment of these two conditions: a) the limitation of the length and reach 
of the control, and exclusion of the content of visited web pages from its scope; b) 
the non-use of employee tracking means specifi cally listed in Section 316(2) LC, was 
suffi  cient for the SC to admit that the object (target) of the employer´s control was not 
to intervene into the employee privacy but only to determine whether the employee 
violated the absolute statutory prohibition of abuse of the employer’s equipment for 
personal purposes. 
However, it was not convincingly explained by the SC why tracking only the 
kind, but not the content of the web pages visited by the employee did not mean 
encroachment upon his privacy. It can be argued that the information needed to 
determine whether a certain web page is job-related or not is information about the 
personal preferences and hobbies of the employee concerned (one can guess whether 
he is fond of shopping, lifestyle, sports, sex etc.). Th e SC surprisingly did not even 
address the question of whether the criterion of proportionality would not be better 
satisfi ed by blocking websites that are oft en abused for out-of-work activities than by 
an ex-post control of the employee’s PC activity.22 Nevertheless, the SC decided very 
similarly on the inspection of a list of telephone calls made by an employee from the 
workplace.23 Although it can be argued that inspecting traces of the employee’s usage 
21 Verbatim the Supreme Court stated (author´s translation): “Control of compliance with this 
prohibition, however, may not be exercised by the employer in an arbitrary manner (in terms of 
scope, length, thoroughness, etc.), as the employer is entitled to do so in an appropriate manner 
only…. In particular, the court will take into account, whether it was an interim or a follow-up 
check, its duration, its scope, whether it did at all (or to what extent) limit the employee in his 
activities and also whether and to what extent did it interfere with the employee’s right to privacy 
etc. Of course, the subject matter of a check can only be to fi nd out if the employee has violated 
the statutory absolute prohibition (or taking into account to what extent did the employer 
consent to mitigate such prohibition) to use his equipment, including his PCs and telephones 
for the employee´s personal purposes. It must always only be a check on non-compliance with 
those obligations which have not been expelled or reduced by the employer. Only such a control 
can be considered as reasonable (proportionate) and therefore legal (in accordance with the 
authorization under the provisions of Section 316 (1) LC)”.
22 For reservations against the Supreme Court decision see for instance J. Vobořil, Nejvyšší soud 
k možnostem utajeného sledování zaměstnanců, “Zpravodaj Gender Studies” 2012, No. 12, 
30.10.2012, http://zpravodaj.genderstudies.cz/cz/clanek/nejvyssi-soud-k-moznostem-utajeneho-
sledovani-zamestnancu (accessed 31.10.2018). 
23 In the case of abuse of a service phone for unauthorized private calls, the Supreme Court decided 
in 2014 in conformity with its earlier decision regarding the inspection of websites visited by the 
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of facilities from PC activity or telephone call logs is also a certain type of monitoring 
or surveillance, the SC drew a dividing line between the targeted ad hoc collection of 
such “footprints” and the continuous monitoring of the employee’s activity (all the 
more so if it includes interference with the secrecy of messages transmitted by him 
etc.). 
Th e SC’s emphasis on the non-use of the means and methods of control listed 
explicitly in Section 316(2) LC, i.e. open or concealed surveillance (monitoring) 
of employees, interception (including recording) of their telephone calls, checking 
their electronic mail or postal consignments addressed to a certain employee, can 
be understood as their qualitative diff erentiation from all other means of control, 
including the acquisition of electronic statements of employee activities at corporate 
facilities (PCs, printers, copy machines, telephones). 
Morávek, one of the frequently publishing experts on the issue, explained such 
a recommendation made by the SC as follows (author´s translation):
“Pursuant to Section 316 (1) exclusively, those cases are handled, regardless of the 
means of control chosen, where it is probable (or de facto certain) that no encroachment 
upon the employee’s privacy can take place. Furthermore Section 316(1) is applicable, 
even if there is interference with the privacy of an employee, if a diff erent form of control 
is chosen other than that enumerated by Section 316 (2) (surveillance (monitoring) of 
employees, interception (including recording) of their telephone calls, checking their 
electronic mail or postal consignments addressed to a certain employee), it can be for 
instance an inspection of a service vehicle’s usage log or other random checks performed 
in real-time for ad hoc cases.”24
It can be seen here that adding the value of an exhaustive enumeration to the list 
of monitoring methods expressly mentioned in Section 316 (2) LC one may draw 
the conclusion that, if the employer fi nds other methods, he may interfere with the 
privacy of his employees. It is very dubious whether the SC really meant that, because 
such an interpretation would deny the logical construction of Section 316, built on 
the assertion that when acting within the limits of its paragraph 1, no violation of 
employee privacy occurs. Abandoning this approach would blur the aforementioned 
distinction between paragraph 1 and paragraphs 2-3 of this Section with all negative 
consequences for legal certainty. Th e fact that, unfortunately, there is such confusion 
in the current Czech debate, can be illustrated by two opinions issued by supervisory 
authorities in 2014, i.e. two years aft er the above cited judgment of the SC. 
employee. If the content of the employee’s telephone calls was not detected and the check was 
focused only on the employee respects for the private use prohibition of the service telephone 
(by review of the telephone numbers called), it was not an employer’s intervention into employee 
privacy but an inspection falling under Section 316 (1) LC. See the Judgment of the Supreme 
Court on the case 21 Cdo 747/2013 (7.08.2014). 
24 J. Morávek, Kontrola a sledování zaměstnanců…, op. cit. n. 16, p. 573. 
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Th e UOOU maintains in its statement that every check of an employee’s internet 
activity falls under the paras 2-3 and not para 1 of Section 316 LC: 
“It is not possible to monitor the use of the Internet by employees for the purposes 
of the employer, unless the statutory conditions are met, i.e. the employer has a serious 
reason rooted in the specifi c nature of his activity … Neither the statistical monitoring 
of the use of Internet access, such as the time spent by an employee “surfi ng” the Internet 
is not in line with the new Labor Code, unless the conditions set out above are met”.25
Contrary to that, the SUIP in its information brochure defended the possibility 
for employers to stay within the limits of para 1 of Section 316 LC: 
“Monitoring of an employee’s activity on the Internet – when it comes to controlling 
the use of the employer’s means by an employee during his/her working hours, must 
always stay within reasonable (proportionate) limits, e.g. if the employee visits 
a “personal page”, such as electronic banking, its content cannot be traced”.26
As can be seen, the same activity called “tracking employee activity on the 
Internet” falls under paras 2-3 of Section 316 according to one supervisory body, 
while the other admits that an appropriate and targeted control of private misuse, not 
disclosing the content of the sites visited, would still be at hand to any employer. For 
greater approximation to what kind of monitoring of employees is always permitted 
under Section 316 LC and what can be used under certain conditions only, or rather 
not allowed at all, the further analysis will focus on the individual criteria which 
infl uence it.
4. Section 316(1) of Labor Code and the proportionality issue
Paragraph 1 of Section 316(1) requires that checking must be conducted by 
an employer in an appropriate or reasonable or proportionate way (depending on 
the translation).27 Th e proportionality of the employer’s checking is underlined by 
commentators28 as well as by supervisory bodies in their instructions for general 
25 UOOU Opinion Nr. 2/2009 updated in February 2014, https://www.uoou.cz/stanovisko-c-2-
2009-ochrana-soukromi-zamestnancu-se-zvlastnim-zretelem-k-monitoringu-pracoviste/d-1511 
(accessed 30.10.2018). Th e UOOU is not, strictly speaking, in a position to give an authoritative 
interpretation of the Labor Code or to supervise employers´ compliance with its provisions. 
However, any recording or monitoring of the employee becomes a processing of the employee´s 
personal data. Th erefore, the UOOU opinion cannot thus be easily dismissed as irrelevant. 
26 SUIP, Ochrana osobních práv zaměstnanců a ochrana majetkových zájmů zaměstnavatele (Pro-
tection of employees’ personal rights and protection of the employer’s property interests), květen 
(May) 2014, http://www.suip.cz/otazky-a-odpovedi/pracovnepravni-vztahy/ochrana-majetk-
ovych-zajmu-zamestnavatele-a-ochrana-osobnich-prav-zamestnance (accessed 31.10.2018). 
27 “Přiměřeným způsobem” in the Czech original, which can be translated by each of the expressions 
used above, however, the term “proportionate way” seems to be the most literal translation. 
28 J. Morávek, Kontrola a sledování zaměstnanců…, op. cit. n. 16.
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public.29 However, in view of the structure of Section 316, it must be emphasized that 
we encounter here the dual meaning or use of the concept of proportionality. 
Under para 1 of this Section, the fulfi llment of the proportionality requirement 
means that the employer’s checking would not encroach upon his employees privacy 
at all or in such an insignifi cant way that paras 2-3 of the same Section would not 
be activated. In this fi rst paragraph, therefore, the proportionality is important as 
a backstop, which ensures that the employer when protecting his ownership does not 
interfere with the employee’s fundamental right to privacy. 
Only when the employer’s control is not proportionate in the sense of para 1 
and aff ects the privacy of employees, the requirement of proportionality gains 
importance of the constitutional test of the same name. It means that the employer’s 
control must be tested whether it is really suitable, necessary and proportionate 
(in a narrow sense of balancing between clashing constitutional right and values). 
Unfortunately, the proportionality in this meaning, which is relevant for the 
understanding and application of paragraphs 2-3 of Section 316 LC, is not mentioned 
at all in its statutory provisions. Its relevance and importance must be inferred from 
standards of constitutionality review conducted by the Czech Constitutional Court 
(hereinaft er CC) and aft er this court by the ordinary courts of the Czech Republic. An 
employer without legal training in this fi eld of law, however, would not learn about 
any proportionality requirement from the wording of paragraphs 2-3 of the Section. 
Th e defi nition of proportionality in the fi rst sense, i.e. as a backstop which 
should keep the employer’s control within the safe harbor of paragraph 1 of Section 
316 LC, was, as a matter of fact, already discussed in the previous chapter on the 
basis of analysis of the SC decision from 2012 regarding the monitoring of employee 
activities on the Internet.30 It can only be added that the SC stressed expressis verbis 
on account of proportionality that (author´s translation): 
“As the law fails to specify what is the most proportionate way of control, it is 
a legal norm with a relatively indefi nite (abstract) hypothesis, i.e. a legal norm whose 
hypothesis is not directly prescribed by law, thus leaving it to the court to defi ne in each 
individual case, from a wide, unlimited range of circumstances, what specifi cally would 
be the hypothesis of the legal norm”. 
If we want to escape from this general reference to circumstances of each 
individual case, it can be specifi ed, based on the abovementioned decisions of the 
SC, that “proportionate” in the sense of Section 316(1) LC would be the control that 
would remain rather limited in scope, that would be better focused on an ex-post 
check of whether the ban on using the employer’s equipment for employees’ private 
purposes has been respected. It is thus possible to check the “footprint” that the 
employee leaves behind that can be ex-post reviewed through a record or statement 
29 UOOU Opinion no 2/2009, op. cit. n. 25, SUIP, op. cit. n. 26. 
30 Judgment of the Supreme Court on the case 21 Cdo 1771/2011 (16.08.2012).
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of PC, telephone or service vehicle use etc. Such a record may cover even a longer 
period of the employee’s activity, such as one full month, as in the abovementioned SC 
case. Th e purpose of such tracking, however, must never be the discovery of content 
of private internet browsing, of sent and received correspondence, of telephone calls 
or privately printed copies or employee monitoring in general.31 
For practical purposes, it can be added, fi rst, that if the ban on using the 
employer´s equipment for private purposes remains absolute, it would always be 
easier to control it as any trace of misuse would signal an employee’s inappropriate 
behavior. If, on the other hand, the ban has been mitigated by the employer’s consent 
to limited private use of his equipment, there must be clearly stated (and to all 
employees explained) a boundary between authorized and non-authorized use. Th is 
can logically lead to misunderstandings and consequent problems. Second, it is of 
no relevance, if the employee “footprint” was recorded by a high-tech or by a more 
traditional means of control as all that is important whether or not the conditions 
of the safe harbor set by Section 316(1) LC were fulfi lled. However, as will be shown 
further, some of the available technical means are more problematic in terms of their 
suitability, because they are rather tools for continuous and intrusive monitoring 
(like on-site cameras) than of an ex-post and limited control. 
Undoubtedly, it remains a shortcoming in the wording used in Section 316 
LC, if there is not stated clearly enough, that an appropriate checking in the sense 
of paragraph 1 is qualitatively diff erent from “monitoring” or “surveillance” 
mentioned in paragraphs 2-3 of this Section. If an ex-post, ad hoc control is not 
unambiguously diff erentiated from real-time and systematic monitoring – reaching 
beyond the need to verify whether an employee is abusing the employer’s equipment 
– then, in practice, both the courts and the supervisory authorities keep speaking 
about “monitoring”, regardless of whether they mean control under paragraph 1 or 
monitoring encroaching upon employees’ privacy in the sense of paragraphs 2-3. For 
example, if we concede that in the statements quoted in the previous chapter, the 
UOOU had in mind the “monitoring” that is systematic and extensive, aff ecting the 
privacy of employees, while the SUIP referred to “monitoring” proportionate by its 
scope and methods, there may be no contradiction between the advice they each give 
addressed to employers. Th e confusion here is once more caused by the use of the 
same term to “monitor” activities on the Internet. 
31 In the following part of this paper, the decision of the Municipal Court in Prague from 2017 is 
mentioned, in which the court assessed the GPS tracking of the Czech Post deliverers, i.e. all 
of their movement throughout working hours. Although it was also carried out for “statistical” 
purposes only, there was a signifi cant diff erence from a survey of the employee’s use of the 
employer’s equipment. GPS tracking of all movement allowed to reconstruct the whole day of 
the employee, not just the inappropriate manipulation of the means entrusted, and that is why it 
interfered with his privacy.
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5. Section 316(2) of Labor Code and the proportionality issue
In cases where the employer interferes with the privacy of the employee, the 
requirement of proportionality in the second meaning comes under the spotlight, 
i.e. the requirement to interfere with the fundamental right in a way that is 
suitable, necessary and proportionate (in a narrow sense). Regarding this second 
proportionality there is a more developed jurisprudence in the Czech Republic due 
to the fact that the majority of litigations having monitoring of employees as their 
subject matter fell under paragraphs 2-3 of Section 316 LC, as the methods used had 
an appreciable impact on employee privacy. It can logically be expected that when 
deploying modern technologies to monitor employees, it becomes very easy to “let 
them run” without restrictions, as opposed to the complexity of their needful and 
precise targeting within a strictly limited time frame.
Virtually since the beginning of the existence of the Czech Republic, the Czech 
CC has applied the aforementioned proportionality test to cases of interference with 
fundamental rights in the public interest, as well as in the event of collision of two 
fundamental rights.32 According to the CC, fundamental rights also have eff ects 
in horizontal relations, and the State has the duty to protect them, even if they are 
interfered with by individuals, for example in relations between employees and 
employers.33 Th e precedence of one fundamental right over another is not and cannot 
be given once and for all, so the proportionality test must always be carried out again 
for each particular case, taking into account its unique circumstances.
In its application of the proportionality test the CC follows the European Court 
of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, and on the theoretical level, 
it refers itself to the understanding of proportionality developed by the German 
theorist R. Alexy.34 Th e CC, however, has not been dogmatic to apply the test all the 
time in a standardized way and in every detail. It has replaced, on case-by-case basis, 
the universal three-tier proportionality test by the requirement of reasonableness of 
the method of enforcement of one party’s fundamental right, and by the requirement 
to avoid extreme disproportionality in the possibility of exercising the fundamental 
right of the other party.35 Courts dealing with civil and administrative disputes follow 
this approach in deciding cases of employee privacy breaches by the employers’ 
monitoring, that is, those covered by Section 316 (2-3) LC.
32 Decision of the Constitutional Court on the case Pl. ÚS 4/94 (12. 10. 1994). See also D. Kosař, 
M.  Antoš., Z.  Kühn, L.  Vyhnánek, Ústavní právo. Casebook, Wolters Kluwer, Praha 2014, 
pp. 362-366.
33 Decision of the Constitutional Court on the case IV ÚS 1735/07 (21.10.2008). 
34 Z.  Červínek, Standardy přezkumu ústavnosti v judikatuře Ústavního soudu, “Jurisprudence” 
2015, No. 4, pp. 21-29.
35 D. Kosař, M. Antoš., Z. Kühn, L. Vyhnánek, Ústavní právo… op. cit. n. 32, pp. 374-375. 
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Th e ruling of the CC from 2014 may be considered symptomatic in this regard.36 
Th e case involved a confl ict of the right to privacy of an employer against the right to 
fair process of an employee, as in the core of the dispute was a hidden record of an 
employer taken by an employee who opposed the termination of his work contract 
because of redundancy. Th e CC fi rst stated that the proportionality test is the method 
used to assess the collision of two fundamental rights and recalled the standard 
three steps of the test. However, in the practical application of the test, the CC was 
satisfi ed with the fi rst step when it found that the hidden record was the only possible 
(and therefore suitable) way in which the weaker party (i.e. employee in relation to 
employer) could prove its claim about the real motive for dismissal. Th e other two 
steps of the proportionality test were not carried out by the CC and its conclusion 
was that ordinary courts had erred in not recognizing as admissible evidence the 
recording of the employers’ arguments secretly acquired by the employee. Th e courts 
thus violated the employee’s right to a fair trial and the constitutional principle of 
weaker party protection. 
Th e SAC follows the CC and considers the proportionality test as a standard 
step of procedure that has to be taken when it comes to the choice of one of the two 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In the Court’s decision-making 
in matters of employee monitoring, there are cases in which the SAC consistently 
carried out the three-step proportionality test, as well as those where it was satisfi ed 
with the reasonable balance between the target and the means of its achievement.37 An 
example of a rigorous application of the proportionality test was the case of camera 
monitoring of drivers and stewards of long-distance buses decided by the SAC in 
2015.38 Th e employer claimed the protection of lives and safety of the transported 
persons as well as of his own property (bus and fare). Th e possibility to add an 
inspector to each bus was rejected by him as diffi  cult and ineffi  cient. He therefore 
defended the camera crew watching during the entire duration of the shift  (capturing 
image, not sound) as perfectly justifi ed. 
His intention to introduce such type of monitoring was notifi ed to the 
UOOU, this supervisory body however, disagreed as it deemed the measure to be 
disproportionate. Th e UOOU itself has examined the notifi ed method of monitoring 
for suitability (found that it could not achieve the declared goals, e.g. better safety 
of passengers), then for necessity (there would be less problematic methods of 
achieving the purpose, as for instance the testimony of passengers) and fi nally also 
for proportionality in the narrow sense. In this respect, the UOOU held that the 
employees’ right to privacy would be violated and the provisions of Section 316(2) 
LC breached as fi lming the entire crew of a bus for the entire duration of the journey 
36 Decision of the Constitutional Court on the case II ÚS 1774/14 (9.12.2014). 
37 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court on the case 5 AS 158/2012– 52 (23.03.2013).
38 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court on the case 10 As 245/2016 – 41 (20.12.2015).
68
Václav Šmejkal
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze 2019 vol. 24 nr 2
amounts to deprivation of privacy as such. Conversely, for example, the scanning of 
the driver’s cabin space only for the time when cash is handled, would be for the 
UOOU a more acceptable form of monitoring. Th e Municipal Court in Prague, 
hearing the employer’s action against the UOOU, fully confi rmed the correctness 
of the proportionality test carried out by the UOOU and concluded that “camera 
monitoring of the driver and the steward and of their immediate surroundings is 
an unjustifi ed and disproportionate interference with privacy of the employees 
concerned”.39 
Th e SAC, ruling on the employer’s cassation complaint against the decision of 
the Municipal Court, also applied the proportionality test. Its judges (as opposed to 
the UOOU and the Municipal Court opinions) concluded that the measure envisaged 
by the employer could fulfi ll the criterion of suitability, as it could act preventively. 
However, the criterion of necessity was no longer fulfi lled because the employer did 
not prove the ineffi  ciency of less intrusive means of checking that could not prevent 
real-life damage and threats that occur during the bus operation. Th e SAC then 
dropped the third step of the proportionality test, because non-fulfi llment of the 
second criterion made further testing pointless.
In the argumentation of the SAC, it is necessary to emphasize a.o. the following: 
if there are no proofs of employees’ misbehavior, which should be prevented by their 
monitoring, then an open intervention into their privacy is unjustifi ed and thus will 
not stand the proportionality test. Th is could mean that the employer’s ordinary, non-
intrusive protective measures should fi rst be overcome by inappropriate employees’ 
acts, and only then could the employer resort to a more sophisticated method of 
tracking them. Without proof of the employer’s negative experience, or at least, 
without reasonable suspicion that employees breach statutory rules and legitimate 
requirements, it is more than probable that interference with employee privacy would 
be deemed disproportionate.
Such conclusion is supported and further developed by another SAC judgment40 
concerning camera systems, in which the Court stated (author´s translation):
“Th e Supreme Administrative Court considers it necessary to emphasize that the 
installation of camera systems, having regard to their nature and interference with the 
personal integrity of persons, can only be achieved if all less invasive devices have failed 
or would not be able to fulfi ll the intended purpose of monitoring”. 
Th is reasoning implies the idea of a certain range of means of control, from 
the least to most intrusive, from which the employer should fi rst select those less 
intrusive. Only in the case of their failure, or an a priori manifest inadequacy, can 
the employer consider switching to more invasive means of monitoring employees. 
Systematic camera scanning throughout the entire workday is of course the most 
39 Judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague on the case 5A 107/2013 (18.10.2016). 
40 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court on the case 5 As 1/2011 – 156 (28.06.2013). 
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intrusive in terms of employee privacy. Conversely, capturing only certain “sensitive” 
moments of an employee’s work, like cash handling, access to certain protected areas 
(box offi  ce, server room etc.), are naturally far more appropriate. Th e commentary 
literature, based on analysis of the aforementioned case law, rightly emphasized that 
“if any aspect of monitoring cannot be considered as strictly necessary, it is necessary 
to say goodbye to it”.41
In this regard, the second step of the proportionality test, consisting of seeking 
an equally eff ective but less intrusive means of control, coincides in both the 
UOOU decision and in subsequent judgments, with the third step of this test. Th e 
latter consists in the assessment of proportionality of interference with privacy in 
the narrow sense (i.e. the search of an acceptable imbalance of rights where one of 
them, for good reason, temporarily wins but the other is not at the same time totally 
denied). In the above-mentioned cases, however, the extensive camera surveillance 
of employees (almost) fully suppressed privacy in the workplace. It was, therefore, 
natural to conclude that the proportionality test was failed when the monitoring 
was aff ecting the entire workplace throughout working hours. Th is conclusion 
is confi rmed by decisions of the Municipal Court in Prague in two other cases of 
employee monitoring.
In the fi rst case, the Municipal Court in Prague carried out the test of 
proportionality of a measure by which the Czech Post monitored 7770 of its mail 
delivery staff  for one whole year. All had to carry a GPS locator each day throughout 
their working hours.42 Th e employer justifi ed the deployment of GPS trackers by the 
need to accelerate and improve services provided within the framework of the legally 
defi ned service of general interest consisting in proper delivery of consignments 
and other values to recipients. At the same time, the Czech Post claimed to be 
interested in mere statistical data without linking them to employee personal data. 
However, the identifi cation of offl  ine data collected with individual deliverers was, 
of course, technically possible. Th e Court therefore agreed with the UOOU that 
the interference with the privacy of the employees was inappropriate because the 
method of monitoring was not a suitable means of verifying that a consignment had 
actually been delivered. Th is was not a necessary measure either, because in order 
to achieve the declared objectives, it would have been suffi  cient to verify whether 
the delivery person actually visited the places to which consignments were to be 
delivered. Regarding the proportionality in the narrow sense, the Court stated that 
the employer did not assess all various possibilities of monitoring and did not choose 
the one that had the least eff ect on the privacy of delivery staff , e.g. not recording all 
movement only the information on time of visit at the place of delivery. 
41 J.  Tomšej, J.  Metelka, Ochana soukromí nad zlato? “EPRAVO.CZ”, 16.09.2013 https://www.
epravo.cz/top/clanky/ochrana-soukromi-nad-zlato-92358.html (accessed 31.10.2018). 
42 Judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague on the case 6 A 42/2013 – 48.183 (5.05.2017). 
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In the second decision of the Municipal Court, the dispute was about camera 
surveillance in PC games stores.43 A substantial part of these stores were continuously 
monitored, including employees behind the cash counter. Th e Court found that if one 
of the essential purposes of such monitoring was to prevent employees from off ering 
discounts to fi ctitious customers (as really happened in practice), the cameras had 
to monitor the area in front of the counter in order to verify whether a customer 
was present at the time of working with the cash. It was therefore unnecessary to 
deprive employees of their privacy by capturing the space behind the counter where 
they were standing most of the time. In both cases it was thus confi rmed that only by 
deploying the least intrusive means of control, however good enough to achieve the 
legitimate goal, the monitoring would be kept within proportionate limits. 
Even though other case law fi ndings regarding cameras in the workplace could 
have been cited, they would not change the following conclusion regarding the 
proportionality of means used to monitor employees in the sense of Section 316 
(2- 3) LC: 
a) employee is under labor contract with employer always as a dependent, 
a weaker party whose privacy in the workplace is therefore by defi nition 
a weakened one. However, he should never be completely deprived of his 
privacy and therefore any means of control, that does so, can only in very 
exceptional cases pass the test of proportionality;
b) appropriate means of control must be suitable to attain the legitimate aim, i.e. 
only those that directly and genuinely lead to that aim would be acceptable. 
Necessary will only be those means that still lead to the goal but are the least 
intrusive of the set of suitable means. Such are the means that target only 
certain risk moments of the employee’s behavior, not all of his behavior at 
work;
c) employer should initially apply “minimal monitoring” (narrowly focused, 
limited in scope and time) and only when this fails and it becomes clear 
that the protection of legitimate interests and rights, or fulfi llment of legal 
obligations of the employer, would not be secured, it is possible to move to 
more extensive and intrusive means of monitoring. 
6. Scope of employee privacy 
Th e statement that an employee has the right to protection of his/her privacy 
in the workplace requires at least a brief outline as to where such privacy in the 
workplace extends.
43 Judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague on the case 8 A 182/2010-69.77 (2.09.2014). 
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Th e right to privacy has a relatively long and fascinating history, in which 
privacy in the workplace is one of the newer chapters whose content is not yet 
closed. In this respect, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is the most 
infl uential promoter within Europe. Th e authorities of the Czech Republic followed 
the guidance of ECtHR already in the 1990s, as evidenced by the 1998 decision of the 
SC44 pointing to the inadmissibility of the secret recording of an employee’s call as 
evidence in a labor dispute. Th e SC referred to the ECtHR case law in Halford v. UK 
and Klopp  v.  Switzerland, that telephone calls made from the workplace may be 
covered by the protection of privacy and inviolability of correspondence within 
the meaning of Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Although the SC originally tried to draw 
a certain dividing line between professional, commercial and public communication 
on the one hand and speeches of a personal nature on the other,45 it is under the 
infl uence of the ECtHR jurisprudence that the SC currently holds the opinion that 
privacy may have a place even where communication is of a professional nature. 
No defi nite conclusions, therefore, can be drawn regarding this or that type of 
recording of a particular act and it is always necessary to proceed in the light of the 
circumstances of each individual case.46 
Commentators also agree with the fact that even in the workplace the rights of 
employees to private and family life must remain real and eff ective.47 Th ey justify this 
in line with the ECtHR and the Czech authorities’ statements, stressing that every 
individual has the right to create and maintain relationships with other human 
beings and thus to develop his private life including in the workplace.48 Only rarely, 
a rejection of this extensive construction of privacy occurs, pointing to the fact 
that if an employer does not allow employees to use his equipment for their private 
purposes, the content of all corporate PCs, servers and mailboxes can be controlled 
without limitation because the employer can logically assume that no private items 
will be found there.49 However, such voices remain exceptional and without infl uence 
on the decision-making of supervisory bodies and courts. Actually, there is no dispute 
in Czech law that even in the workplace an employee has always the right to a private 
44 Judgment of the Supreme Court on the case 21 Cdo 1009/98 (21 10.1998). 
45 Judgment of the Supreme Court on the case 30 Cdo 64/2004 (11.05.2005)
46 Judgment of the Supreme Court on the case 30 Cdo 1585/2012 (27.03.2013). 
47 P. Molek, Základní práva. Svazek 1. Důstojnost, Wolters Kluwer, Praha 2017, p. 335. Likewise 
M.  Štefk o, Ochrana soukromí zaměstnanců ve světle čl. 8 Úmluvy o ochraně lidských práv 
a základních svobod. “Jurisprudence” 2012, No. 7, p. 17. 
48 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 12 December 1992 on the case Niemietz v. 
Germany, application No. 13710/88 and UOOU Opinion No. 6/2009. 
49 L.  Ticháčková, Vlastnictví zaměstnavatele versus soukromí zaměstnance…, op. cit. n. 2. Th e 
UOOU, for instance, in its Opinion No. 1/2003 emphasizes that for the existence of the employee’s 
right to privacy it is irrelevant that the employee uses communications or other facilities of 
the employer. Th e location and ownership of an electronic device cannot exclude the right to 
confi dentiality of its communications and correspondence. 
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sphere, be it in an offi  ce or in any diff erent kind of workplace (including in company 
vehicles etc.).50 As one commentator rightly explained, it is an employee’s space in 
which, although for a limited time and perhaps only partially, he can stop playing 
his social roles or can change them.51 It also implies that in the workplace there are 
areas with diff erent degrees of privacy, from those where monitoring is justifi ed 
and basically foreseen (access to workplaces, risk areas, etc.), to those in which any 
intrusive monitoring will always be inadequate and illegal. Th ese are especially the 
places reserved for hygiene (showers, toilets) and employee rest areas, as the SAC has 
repeatedly emphasized in its decisions.52 
Th e approach of the Czech supervisory and judicial authorities follows the 
ECtHR’s case law also in the rejection of attempts to give to the concept of privacy 
an always valid exhaustive defi nition. Privacy is in Czech law a “fuzzy“ term as to its 
scope and content and its exact meaning must be found in each individual case.53 Th e 
SAC has literally stated in one of its abundantly quoted decisions54 that, in following 
the ECtHR, it does not intend to bind the concept of private life, understood in 
a broad sense, to any exhaustive defi nition. It is not always possible to distinguish 
clearly what constitutes the work of an individual and what constitutes his private 
life. Th e decision of the SAC concerned the audiovisual recording of a taxi driver 
inside his car, acquired by the staff  of the control body, i.e. the Lord Mayor of Prague 
Offi  ce. Th e case therefore diff ered from private law disputes between employees and 
employers, but it is signifi cant for the present analysis that the Prague Municipal 
Court fi rst found that such a recording did not catch anything private and the taxi 
driver’s right to private life was not aff ected.55 Th e SAC, however, took an opposite 
view. Th e taxi driver spends most of his working day in the vehicle, communicates 
with customers during journeys and thus develops his contacts with the outside 
world, which implies that the public authority has prima facie aff ected the right to 
private life of a taxi driver within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR. 
Referring to the previous analysis (relating to the interpretation of Section 316(1) 
LC), it is worth recalling that the extent of the private sphere of an employee in the 
workplace is, a contrario, defi ned by those options of employee checking that, although 
implemented through sophisticated technological devices, are not considered as an 
interference with privacy. Th e private sphere of an employee, as we have seen, does 
50 E. Janečková, V. Bartík, Ochrana osobních údajů v pracovním právu…, op. cit. n. 12, p. 132.
51 J. Morávek, Kontrola a sledování zaměstnanců…, op. cit. n. 16, p. 573. 
52 For instance, in the Judgment of the Supreme Admnistrative Court on teh case 5 As 158/2012 – 49 
(23.08.2013) it was stated that: “Monitoring must be directed at the employer’s property, not the 
employee’s person (camera direction), and must be done at the workplace, not in the hygienic or 
resting places”.
53 J. Morávek, Kontrola a sledování zaměstnanců…, op. cit. n. 16, p. 573.
54 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court on the case 1 AFs 60/2009 (5.11.2009). 
55 Judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague on the case 10 Ca 99/2007 (22.01.2009). 
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not go so far as to prevent the employer from registering the employee´s access to 
the Internet at the workplace. However, if an employer controls also the content of 
websites visited, the legal border will already be exceeded.56 Similarly, an employer 
does not interfere with employee privacy by tracking the number of emails received 
and sent, and with whom they are exchanged.57 Likewise, Czech commentators 
concede that GPS monitoring of a service vehicles location is also outside the privacy 
of an employee, because in this case it is indeed about protection of the employer’s 
property (and there is a qualitative diff erence from the tracking of employees as such 
- by which Czech Post violated their privacy in the above-mentioned case).58 
7. Th e nature of activity justifying intrusion into privacy
If under the Section 316(2) LC, a proportionate encroachment upon employee 
privacy may be justifi ed by “a serious cause consisting in the employer’s nature of 
activity”, every employer would certainly wonder whether activities carried out 
by his company are of such a sensitive nature. At the same time, it is unlikely that 
anyone will be surprised that the law or subordinate regulations (or the explanatory 
memorandum to the Labor Code) contain no list of such activities, and again 
everything is defi ned case-by-case, within the reasonable discretion of judicial and 
administrative decision-makers.
Here, again, the above-mentioned recommendation to distinguish control, from 
surveillance or monitoring of employees, makes sense. Th is is because every employer 
can check whether employees are abusing his resources, whether they eff ectively use 
working time, produce good results etc., but only if he does not interfere with their 
privacy.59 On the contrary, to survey or monitor employees, i.e. to interfere with their 
56 Judgment of the Supreme Court on the case 21 Cdo 1771/2011 (16.08.2012). Likewise 
in H.  Zemanová Šimonová, Právní prostředky ochrany osobnosti zaměstnance, “Buletin 
advokacie” 31.10.2016, http://www.bulletin-advokacie.cz/pravni-prostredky-ochrany-osobnosti-
zamestnance?browser=mobi (accessed 31.10.2018)
57 UOOU Opinion no. 2/2009 confi rms that assessment especially “if there is suspicion of misuse of 
the means of work”.
58  J.  Metelka, GPS na pranýři aneb sledování zaměstnanců, “Právní prostor”, 15.04.2014, https://
www.pravniprostor.cz/clanky/pracovni-pravo/gps-na-pranyri-aneb-sledovani-zamestnancu 
(accessed 31.10.2018). Th is author emphasizes that if an employer allows employees to use 
a service vehicle for private use, its GPS monitor unit must give the possibility to switch between 
private and service régime of the car, in order to avoid tracking while the employee is using 
the car privately. Likewise see in S. Bednář, Metelka J., GPS monitoring zaměstnanců podruhé, 
“EPRAVO.CZ”, 18.07.2017, https://www.epravo.cz/top/clanky/gps-monitoring-zamestnancu-
podruhe-106141.html (accessed 31.10.2018). 
59 According to H.  Zemanová Šimonová, Právní prostředky ochrany osobnosti zaměstnance…, 
op. cit. n. 56, these reasons are generally in the interest of each employer and therefore are not 
specifi c enough to represent serious cause. Nonetheless, in the instructions posted on the Internet, 
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privacy in a proportionate way, can only be introduced by an employer who has 
serious cause to do so. Th is cause usually does not exist, according to the SUIP, in the 
production of ordinary products or the provision of routine services.60 However, such 
a simple answer is not a suffi  cient guide to practice, although it can be deduced from it 
that the protection of the employer’s property in general is not, in any circumstances, 
a legitimate reason for limiting the fundamental right of employees to privacy. 
Both the commentary literature and the UOOU in their statements suggest 
that a better guideline as to whether there is an increased or extraordinary need for 
oversight at the workplace can be provided by a kind of “situational analysis”, made 
from the position of an objective, impartial observer. Th e serious cause for such 
monitoring is thus given when:
 – important sums of cash are handled (e.g. international bank transfers61);
 – the workplace is subject to a special regime (e.g. prisoners’ work,62 classifi ed 
information63);
 – there is an increased risk of injury, explosion etc.64 (chemical plants, nuclear 
power plants65);
 – there is a prevailing reason for the protection of intellectual and industrial 
property rights or very valuable know-how, personal data of third parties,66 
equal treatment and non-discrimination, if these rights are reasonably 
endangered.67 
confusing enumerations of reasons that should justify employee monitoring which include 
not only the protection of life and health in the workplace, but also the control of employee 
performance. See for instance D.  Řezníček, T.  Černický, Problematika kamerového systému 
na pracovišti, “EPRAVO.CZ”, 27.07.2018, https://www.epravo.cz/top/clanky/problematika-
kameroveho -systemu-na-pracovisti-107905.html (accessed 31.10.2018). However, in the case of 
high-tech monitoring, it is not possible to agree with such suggestions.
60 See the web of SUIP http://www.suip.cz/otazky-a-odpovedi/pracovnepravni-vztahy/ochrana-
majetkovych-zajmu-zamestnavatele-a-ochrana-osobnich-prav-zamestnance/monitorovani-
zamestnancu-na-pracovisti-kamerovym-systemem/ (accessed 31.10.2018).
61 UOOU opinion No. 2/2009, op. cit. n. 25.
62 Ibidem.
63 See for instance in H. Zemanová Šimonová, Právní prostředky ochrany osobnosti zaměstnance…, 
op. cit. n. 56. 
64 E. Janečková, V. Bartík, Ochrana osobních údajů v pracovním právu…, op. cit. n. 12, p. 132.
65 J. Vych, Navrhovaná změna v oblasti ochray soukromí zaměstnanců, “EPRAVO.CZ”, 4.09.2015, 
https://www.epravo.cz/top/clanky/navrhovana-zmena-v-oblasti-ochrany-soukromi-
zamestnancu-98803.html (accessed 31.10.2018). 
66 L. Jouza, Ochrana osobnosti zaměstnance v pracovněprávních vztazích, “EPRAVO.CZ”, 9.10.2017, 
https://www.epravo.cz/top/clanky/ochrana-osobnosti-zamestnance-v-pracovnepravnich-vzta-
zich-106434.html (accessed 31.10.2018); K. Valentová, Jak legálně sledovat zaměstnance, “Právní 
rádce”, 8.07.2016, http://www.vilmkovadudak.cz/Media.aspx?id=534 (accessed 31.10.2018). 
67 P. Molek, Základní práva… op. cit. n. 47, p. 339.
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Of course, such enterprise as the State Printer of Valuables (Státní tiskárna cenin) 
would be included in this enumeration, but only in a situation where it actually prints 
banknotes, stamps or state bonds. Camera surveillance of employees (and subsequent 
processing of the fi lmed material without their consent) done at the moment when 
less sensitive products, such as meal vouchers and tickets were being printed, was 
found to be unjustifi ed by the UOOU and then by the Municipal Court in Prague.68 
Th e use of sophisticated tracking techniques must be proportionate to the seriousness 
of the cause. In the above-mentioned cases, the camera surveillance of bus crews and 
the GPS tracking of Czech Post delivery staff  during their entire work period could 
not be justifi ed by the nature of their activity and by the risks it may cause. Similarly, 
the SAC has stated in the case of cameras designed to ensure the safety and protection 
of guests and hotel staff  that the luxury category of the hotel was not in itself suffi  cient 
justifi able reason for such an intense encroachment upon privacy.69
A logical question of every employer operating a shop would be whether the work 
with cash (of what volume?) justifi es the monitoring of sales staff  and cashiers. Even 
in these cases, the monitoring of employees at work is usually very disproportionate, 
especially when it is a pre-emptive measure to prevent possible cases of fraud. Th e 
use of (most oft en) cameras must be based on reasonable suspicion and should be 
focused on cash movements, discount coupons, etc., not on employees at work.70 
Th is follows both from the aforementioned case law of Czech Courts (tracking the 
fares collected by a bus crew,71 or discounts provision in a PC game shop72) and from 
the ECtHR case law. Th e Strasbourg Court found in Köpke v. Germany (2010)73 that 
a time-limited video surveillance aimed exclusively at persons reasonably suspected 
of theft  was permissible, while in the case Lopez Ribalda and others v. Spain (2018)74 it 
outlawed the extensive camera surveillance of cashiers in a supermarket, even though 
it had led to fi ve of them being convicted of theft . 
Th e amount of cash or values in general handled by an employee, which would 
justify a “serious cause” for monitoring, is nowhere precisely defi ned. A reasonable 
consideration suggests that the value concerned must not be negligible. Sounds like 
68 Judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague on the case 6 Ca 227/2008 (27.09.2011). 
69 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court on the case 5 As 158/2012 (23.08.2013). 
70 Th e commentators also stress the condition that “the threat must be real”, see in P.  Molek, 
Základní práva…, op. cit. n. 47, p. 339, or that “frequent theft s” occur, see B.  Jarošová, Co je 
a není protiprávní, když vás šéf sleduje nejen kamerou, “Idnes.cz”, 5.05.2017, https://fi nance.
idnes.cz/legislativa-kamery-na-pracovisti-kontrola-aut-e-mailu-a-telefonu-phf-/podnikani.
aspx?c=A170427_2321709_podnikani_kho (accessed 31.10.2019). 
71 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court on the case 10 As 245/2016 – 41 (20.12.2017). 
72 Judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague on the case 8 A 182/2010- 69.77 (2.09.2014). 
73 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 October 2010 on the case Köpke 
v. Germany, application No. 420/07.
74 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 9 January 2018 on the case Lopez Ribalda 
and others v. Spain, application No. 1874/13 and 8567/13. 
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an anecdote in this regard, a case where the ÚOOÚ had to deal with the deployment 
of cameras in a kitchen of an offi  ce building, which was to prevent the theft  of yogurts 
from a fridge.75 Th e cases mentioned above, however, show that even “normal” 
operating amount of cash collected by the cash register does not constitute a suffi  cient 
reason for continuous camera monitoring. For the diffi  culty of determining what 
cash at the cash register is already a reason to monitor, it is always preferable to give 
priority to an agreement on employees’ responsibility for the amount entrusted, 
which relieves the employer of the obligation to prove fault of employees in the event 
of loss or defi cit.
8. Information or consent, open or covert monitoring
It is probably the least obvious to Czech employers, also to their advisers and 
legal commentators, whether and when it is possible to monitor employees in secret, 
or vice versa, whether it is always necessary to inform them or even to obtain their 
consent. It is perhaps not surprising that the prevailing uncertainty and diverging 
opinions are due to the unclear wording of legal provisions on the one hand, and case 
law that is sometimes inadequate and sometimes diffi  cult to interpret on the other. 
Section 316(2) LC speaks of “open or concealed surveillance (monitoring) of 
employees” and it can therefore be construed that both forms of monitoring are, as 
the case may be, permissible. Para 3 of the same Section however requires, that in 
case of any surveillance in the sense of para 2, the employer shall directly inform 
employees about the scope and methods of his control. To conciliate the concealed 
or covert surveillance mentioned in para 2 with the obligation to keep employees 
informed about it, is possible if such information is given only ex-post, aft er the 
monitoring was carried out. However, such an interpretation of obligation set by 
law seems superfl uous or even redundant as in any subsequent confl ict between the 
employer and the employee, the latter would always learn that the former gathered 
evidence about his or her misbehavior through surveillance in the workplace. On 
the other hand, preliminary information given to an employee that “starting from 
tomorrow cameras will monitor your activity” would hardly meet with the consent 
of that employee and is most unlikely to catch him doing something wrong. What 
then is the correct conduct, which would not infringe the law and still be effi  cient in 
securing protection of the employer´s rights and legitimate interests? 
Relatively simple is the answer to the question of whether or not the employer 
needs the employee’s consent. Section 316 LC does not provide for such consent and 
it is assumed that obtaining approval from an employee to interfere with his privacy 
would be unlawful and void. With such approval, an individual in the position of 
75 A.  Vejvodová, Šéf není velký bratr. Za šmírování zaměstnanců hrozí fi rmám nově milionová 
pokuta, “Právní rádce”, 4.10.2017. 
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a weaker party would give up his or her fundamental right in favor of the stronger 
party. Such is the unambiguous position of Working Party 29 at the EU level,76 as well 
as of the Czech UOOU77 and of local commentators.78 Section 316 is formulated as 
a mandatory provision of law, and the employer must assume that his monitoring is 
either legal under the Labor Code or is not. Th e employee’s approval cannot change 
anything there, and certainly cannot legalize an intervention into privacy that does 
not meet the requirements of paras 2-3 of Section 316 LC. 
Also, an employer can partly be confused by the wording of Section 86 of the 
Civil Code, according to which “it is not possible to disrupt privacy without the 
consent of the person concerned”. Every employer, however, must remember that for 
the monitoring of employees there is a lex specialis to this provision of the Civil Code, 
and that is Section 316 LC. Only if, vice versa, the employer were to be tapped by an 
employee, as in the case discussed above79 (that ended with the Constitutional Court 
decision), the general provisions of the Civil Code (Sections 86-88) would apply. 
If the defense of fundamental rights of the weaker party were depending on it, the 
secret recording of an employer by an employee (and its subsequent use as evidence 
in a labor dispute) would be admissible.
An employer’s uncertainty may also derive from the provisions of Article 6(1) of 
the GDPR, i.e. from the personal data protection requirements. Th is provision allows 
for the processing of personal data when the data subject has given consent to it for 
one or more specifi c purposes (Art 6(1)a GDPR), or also when such processing is 
necessary for the legitimate interests pursued by a controller or by a third party, except 
where such interests are overridden by interests or fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the data (Art 6(1)f GDPR). Here, the employer must consider once more that if 
he wants to make a record of a particular employee’s behavior and further process 
it, he must stay within the limits of proportionality. In view of all that has been said 
so far, it is (almost) certain that any wider and systematic monitoring of employees 
at the workplace will not fi t into the option provided by Art 6(1)f GDPR. And since 
the consent of employees with such monitoring under Art 6(1)a GDRP would violate 
the provisions of Section 316 LC, the employer should not be even tempted to seek to 
acquire it. 
76 WP 29 was established as an independent advisory body to Article 29 of (now no longer valid) 
the Data Protection Directive. On the issues of obtaining the consent of the employee it took 
a position in its Opinion No. 2/2017, p. 4. 
77 See for instance D. Dostál, GDPR ovlivní také kamerové systémy ve fi rmách. Na co si podniky 
musí dát pozor? “BusinessInfo.cz”, 9.01.2018, http://www.businessinfo.cz/cs/clanky/gdpr-ovlivni-
take-kamerove-systemy-ve-fi rmach-na-co-si-podniky-musi-dat-pozor-99784.html (accessed 
31.10.2018). 
78 E. Janečková, V. Bartík, Ochrana osobních údajů v pracovním právu…, op. cit. n. 12, p. 132. 
79 Decision of the Constitutional Court on th case II. ÚS 1774/14 (9.12.2014). 
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Information to employees, however, is not the same as their consent and the real 
puzzle for employers, therefore, is whether and when employees can be monitored 
in the sense of paras 2-3 of Section 316 LC without their knowledge. Although 
paragraph 2 refers to the possibility of employee concealed (or covert) monitoring, 
a clear answer to the question of whether and when it is possible is missing in Czech 
law. Section 316(3) LC specifi cally requires employers to inform employees directly 
but does not say to do so beforehand. 
On the one hand, there is the SAC judgment from 2013,80 in which the Court for 
the interpretation of Section 316 clearly states (author’s translation):
“Monitoring of employees is only possible on prior notice and only where 
it is necessary to protect the health of the person or property of the employer ... Th e 
information to the employee before the start of monitoring should also explain the scope 
and method of carrying out such control”. 
Th e SAC in this statement, unfortunately, also mixes the terms “control” and 
“monitoring”, which could lead to uncertainty as to whether the employer proceeds 
according to para 1 or para 2 of Section 316 LC. From the circumstances of the case 
(the permanent camera surveillance of hotel premises) and from the content of the 
SAC judgment, it can be safely inferred that this was about monitoring within the 
meaning of para 2 of this Section. For these types of employee tracking, the SAC 
requires prior notifi cation. In connection with this, some commentators urge 
employers to forget about hidden monitoring of employees. Th ey recommend them 
to include the possibility of monitoring to the company´s internal regulations, to 
discuss it in advance with employees’ representatives and to post relative information 
on notice boards in the company’s premises.81 Such approach ultimately points to 
the priority of prevention over intrusion into privacy. An employer warning his 
employees about the possibility of monitoring in the workplace can practically reduce 
the risk of their inappropriate behavior without risking violation of the Labor Code. 
Nevertheless, opinions can also be found which, for particularly serious reasons, 
and thus exceptionally, allow the covert monitoring of employees.82 Logically, these are 
not cases which fall under Section 316(1) LC, within which the employer, through his 
control without warning, does not interfere with the privacy of employees. Here, it is 
about those exceptional cases where the employer’s tracking technology will interfere 
80 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court on the case 5 As 158/2012 – 49 (23.12.2013).
81 M.  Štefk o, K problému sledování vlastních zaměstnanců, “Právo a zaměstnání” 2005, No. 1; 
M. Štefk o, Soukromí zaměstnanců pod ochranou inspelce práce…, op. cit. n. 14; T. Kadlecová, 
Monitoring zaměstnanců, “Praktická personalistika” 2015, No. 11-12, p. 27; J.  Zahradníček, 
Sledování elektronických komunikací na pracovišti, “Právní rádce” 2016, No. 11; M. Hromanda, 
Ochrana osobnosti zaměstnance při elektronické komunikaci… op. cit. n. 14.
82 J. Morávek, Kontrola a sledování zaměstnanců…, op. cit. n. 16; Kalvoda A., Ochrana majetkových 
zájmů zaměstnavatele, ochrana osobních práv zaměstnance a inspekce práce, “Práce a mzda”, 
2018, No. 6.
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with the privacy of employees without their knowledge, and yet it will be legal. Th e 
SC had the opportunity to comment on the issue in 2017 when a GPS monitoring 
device was installed in a service vehicle used by an employee and the employee 
concerned learned about it only during the use of the vehicle.83 Unfortunately, due to 
a procedural error of the complainant-employee (when submitting an extraordinary 
remedy he changed his objections and arguments in comparison with the previous 
court proceedings), the SC rejected his appeal without assessing the merits of the 
case. Th e guideline can thus be found only in the existing case law of the ECtHR, 
which the Czech courts usually follow.
Th e ECtHR in the Köpke v. Germany case from 2010, found no breach of the 
Convention in the way the German courts approved the covert video surveillance 
of employees in one supermarket department operated by a hired detective agency. 
Surveillance was based on suspicion and the Court took it as being relatively targeted, 
and also proportionate in terms of time-span, even though all employees of the 
department were monitored over several weeks. To what extent the result of this case 
can be generalized, however, is a matter of debate.84 Given that Section 316 LC does 
not contain an explicit ban on covert monitoring, the domestic situation is not unlike 
the conditions in Germany that played a role in the given case. Everything would 
probably depend on the proportionality test that the Czech courts would apply in 
similar cases. On the other hand, in the newer decision of 2017, in the case Bărbulescu 
v. Romania,85 where the e-mail communication of an employee was monitored (i.e. 
not only the privacy but also the secrecy of correspondence was violated), the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR stressed that “for the measures to be deemed compatible 
with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention, the notifi cation should be clear 
about the nature of the monitoring and be given in advance.”86
If a Czech employer wants to be sure that he will not enter into confl ict with the 
law, he should (also for the sake of compliance with the requirements of personal 
data protection) indicate the possibility of monitoring in his work regulations and 
inform about it to every employee before an employment contract is signed.87 And 
83 Judgment of the Supreme Court on the case 21 Cdo 817/2017 (7.06.2017). 
84 See especially the above mentioned ECtHR descision in Lopez Ribalda v. Spain from 2018. Unlike 
the Köpke v. Germany case, the camera fi lming here was contrary to the Convention because it 
was focused enough, it was not based on suspicion of specifi c employees, and the Spanish law 
explicitly required preliminaryinformation about such monitoring. 
85 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights on the case of 5 September 2017 on the case 
Bărbulescu v. Romania, application No. 61496/08. 
86 Th e European Court of Human Rights, Q & A Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Bărbulescu 
v. Romania (application No. 61496/08), Press Unit, Strasbourg 5.09.2017. 
87 UOOU in its Opinion No. 2/2009 emphasizes that this information duty is not fullfi lled by 
a mere placement of signboard with the words “camera surveillance”, but only by providing full 
information about who is the data controller, where he/she can be contacted, as well as the details 
on how the collected data are processed. 
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then only, if there is a reasonable suspicion that such precautionary warning has 
not been enough and employees are seriously damaging the employer´s rights and 
legitimate interests, threatening health and safety in the workplace, he could then risk 
a very targeted and short-term deployment of sophisticated techniques to monitor 
them. Under such circumstances, this can be done without warning them again, that 
precisely on them and from tomorrow on, this monitoring will be used. Even in this 
case, as highlighted above, the monitoring should target the protected values (cash, 
keys, servers, access to special objects, hazardous handling of chemicals, etc.) rather 
than people in the workplace. Of course, the best assurance that could be given to 
Czech employers is by the Czech legislators if they would clarify the wording of paras 
2-3 of Section 316 LC so as not to raise doubts as to whether the mention of concealed 
(covert) surveillance means its admissibility or not and whether direct information 
means advanced information or not. 
9. Notes on individual methods of employee monitoring 
Notwithstanding the extent of the previous analysis, it has not been possible to 
present all information that can be gained from the existing practice of the Czech 
administrative and judicial authorities regarding the legality of using various 
tracking tools that may cause diff erent types of interference with employees’ privacy. 
Th erefore, this sub-chapter briefl y summarizes the fi ndings on diff erent types of 
modern technologies that are usually used for tracking of employees. 
Regarding cameras in the workplace, which has been given overwhelming 
attention so far, there should be no doubt that nowadays they represent one of the most 
obvious violations of employee privacy. As mentioned in the Introduction, control by 
the SUIP recently discovered that employers’ abuse of camera monitoring featured in 
80% of cases inspected by this authority. Camera surveillance of the workplace itself 
(i.e. not of entry to the company premises, or in lift s and corridors) must always be 
the last option for safeguarding property and health, during specifi c activities that 
justify such monitoring in the sense of Section 316(2) LC. Th erefore, it can never be 
used to monitor the effi  ciency of employees’ performance. To keep within the limits 
of proportionality, cameras should be aimed at the employer’s sensitive equipment or 
facility rather than on the staff . Cameras should be totally excluded in places where 
the employee is changing and performing hygiene. For example, an employer may 
use a photo trap on a sensitive device or a camera to monitor empty premises aft er 
termination of working hours.88 In these justifi ed and reasonable cases of camera 
monitoring there should not even be the problem of having to inform everyone in 
88 V. Odrobinová, Narušení soukromí zaměstnanců může nově trestat i inspektorát práce. Firmám 
hrozí až milionová pokuta. post on https://www.vox.cz/naruseni-soukromi-zamestnancu-muze-
nove-trestat-i-inspektorat-prace.html (accessed 31.10.2018).
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the workplace. However, in the case law of the Czech courts, so far there has not 
been a single case where camera surveillance of employees in the workplace has been 
found suitable, necessary and proportionate.
GPS trackers are most commonly used in service vehicles, where such method of 
tracking may be fully proportionate. Service vehicles are the property of the employer 
and should be protected correspondingly. It is however diffi  cult to justify the 
deployment of GPS trackers only by better traffi  c safety, because these devices cannot 
avert traffi  c accidents. In the case of a company car intended both to commute to 
work and to visit clients, the GPS device should operate (be switched on) only during 
“work related” journeys. Th erefore, the use of a GPS tracker is more appropriate if the 
employer does not permit the use of the vehicle for private purposes. When a vehicle 
is assigned to a particular employee, the processing of GPS data always means the 
processing of his personal data. Th e employee does not have to agree to GPS tracking 
of the vehicle (see art. 6(1) f GDPR) but should be informed about it. Th e employer 
is also legally entitled, even required, to record usage data for the vehicle in a log 
book of journeys made and mileage accrued (for accounting and tax purposes).89 
A completely diff erent case would be a GPS tracking of employees as individuals 
during working hours. For that, justifi cation could only be found in extraordinary 
situations, such as the movement of rescue workers in a burning factory, but not, for 
example, to track the accuracy and effi  ciency of mail delivery personnel.90 
Th e biometric identifi cation of employees is in some way close to GPS tracking, 
although it is most oft en used to record their time of arrival to and departure from the 
workplace. Th e UOOU considers that the use of these systems for routine recording 
is a disproportionate collection of personal data and hence an interference with 
employee privacy if the biometric data are stored in a device in a form that permits 
their further processing.91 In some cases, however, biometric identifi cation can be 
used to control access (in the case of nuclear installations it is even mandatory in 
the Czech Republic92), respectively, to monitor whether there are only authorized 
employees in the workplace, or also other persons. For these authentication/
verifi cation purposes, it may not be necessary to retain the collected personal data in 
any stable database. Th erefore, certain uses of biometric identifi cation may be both 
proportionate and legal. Th e UOOU itself, however, points to a contradiction with 
Section 316 LC in the use of biometric identifi cation beyond the records of employee 
presence in the workplace, e.g. to control employee movements within the premises 
89 S. Bednář, J. Metelka, GPS monitoring zaměstnanců podruhé…, op. cit. n. 58, with reference to the 
practice of the UOOU, state that an electronic book of journeys is considered by this supervisory 
body much more leniently than direct employee monitoring.
90 Judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague on the case 6 A 42/2013 – 48.183 (5.05.2017). 
91 UOOU Opinion No. 1/2017, https://www.uoou.cz/stanovisko-c-1-2017-biometricka-identifi k-
ace-nebo-autentizace-zamestnancu/d-23849/p1=3569 (accessed 31.10.2018). 
92 Decree No. 144/1997 Coll., on physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. 
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(collection and processing of data on individuals resulting from traces left  by such 
movements, etc.). In essence, if GPS and biometric tracking would become similar 
to a chip implanted under the skin of an employee, it will always be disproportionate 
and therefore prohibited for the overwhelming majority of employers.93 
E-mail monitoring is also a very sensitive issue, because of the possibility to violate 
the secrecy of correspondence, which is explicitly protected at both international and 
constitutional levels, (beyond the scope of general privacy protection). However, 
according to the SUIP, this type of monitoring is currently the most frequent case 
of privacy violation in the Czech Republic.94 In previous chapters, the diff erence was 
explained between, on the one hand, the employer’s control over whether an employee 
does not abuse a work PC for unauthorized private communication, which can be 
achieved by a random check of number of emails received and sent to non-job-related 
addresses and, on the other hand, the invasion of employee privacy and secrecy of 
communications.95 Th e employer can access the content of an E-mail sent to the 
address containing the name of an employee (even if the domain is a company name) 
but only in very exceptional cases where it is necessary for the performance of work 
tasks, the negligence of which would seriously harm the employer´s business. Th is 
can happen, for example, in the case of a sudden illness or injury of an employee and 
only during the period of time taken to redirect all of his business communications 
to another employee.96 Even here of course, the employer is not permitted to read 
E-mails whose content is obviously not connected to the employee’s business activity. 
Th e described limitations do not apply to E-mails addressed to the company address 
such as info@company.cz.
Th e monitoring of employee activity on PCs and social networks is again a question 
of the proportionality of the protected purpose and the chosen means of control. It 
was shown above that the SC did not consider as a violation of privacy the control of 
number of hours spent by an employee on a company PC and the internet viewing 
web pages unrelated to company business.97 Th e proportionality threshold here, as in 
the case of E-mails, was to abstain from inspecting the content of web pages visited 
or fi les downloaded by the employee concerned. Very interesting in this context is 
93 P. Molek, Základní práva…, op. cit. n. 47, p. 340. 
94 K. Kolářová, Většina stížností na nepřiměřené sledování v práci je oprávněná…, op. cit. n. 3.
95 Th e UOOU requires that if the employer steadily monitors and evaluates only the volume of 
e-mails and whether they are directed to work-related addresses, then the employees must be 
informed about the implementation of the tracking tools. See web UOOU https://www.uoou.cz/
zamestnavatele/ds-5057/archiv=0&p1=2611 (accessed 31.10.2018). Th is should be done even 
when monitoring may be necessary, for instance to prevent employees from contravening Act 
No. 127/2005 Coll. about electronic communications by disseminating spam from the company’s 
E-mail address. Likewise J. Mikulecký, Monitorování zaměstnanců je legální!, “DSM” 2010, No. 3. 
96 A. Kubíčková, V. Patáková, Ochrana osobních údajů zaměstnanců od A (přes GDPR) do Z, “Práce 
a mzda” 2017, No. 11. 
97 Judgment of the Supreme Court on the case 21 Cdo 1771/2011 (16.08.2012). 
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the recent ECtHR case law, Libert v. France, from 201898. In it, the Court allowed 
the possibility of checking the PC content of a redundant employee (without his 
knowledge), in which pornographic material was discovered in a folder labeled 
“personal”. Th e peculiarity of this decision is the fact that had the employee placed 
these fi les in a folder marked “private”, the employer would not have been allowed 
to perform such control without the former employee’s knowledge and presence (as 
limited use of the PC for “private” purposes was authorized). Despite some formalism 
of the decision, there is a consistency with the recommendation of the Working Party 
(hereinaft er WP) 29 (refl ected in the opinions of Czech supervisory bodies as well 
as in the literature), that on the company’s server or cloud service, each employee 
should have a designated space (appropriately labeled) to which other employees and 
the employer cannot enter.99 
A clearly disproportionate interference with privacy is found when an employer 
tries to covertly monitor employees’ personal profi les on social network sites such as 
Facebook or Twitter. WP29, as well as Czech commentators, however, believe that in 
exceptional cases and with the awareness of the employees concerned, such targeted 
and unsystematic monitoring could be lawful, if for instance a valuable business 
secret is to be protected.100 Finally, it is beyond doubt that the employer has the 
right to check whether employees install illegal soft ware on a company PC or do not 
connect to it devices that could endanger the protection of company data, since in 
these cases of protection of property the content of fi les created by employees would 
not be disclosed.
Telephone call recording is quite common in call centers where it is used to control 
the quality of client requests´ processing. In these cases, undoubtedly service calls 
from a dedicated service line and equipment are made, and both parties are warned 
from the outset that their conversation may be monitored.101 In other cases, where 
an employer is interested in whether and to what extent employees use his facilities 
and working time to deal with their private matters, the analogy with E-mails and 
with the abuse of company PCs is fully applicable. Pursuant to Section 316 (1) LC, 
98 Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 22 February 2018 on the case Libert v. 
France, application No. 588/13. 
99 WP 29 Opinion No. 2/2017. 
100 Ibidem; see also E.  Škorničková, Důvěřuj, ale prověřuj? GDPR zpřísňuje monitoring zaměst-
nanců, “GDPR.cz”, 6.03.2018, https://www.gdpr.cz/blog/monitoring-zamestnancu/ (accessed 
31.10.2018); M. Nulíček, K. Kovaříková, J. Tomíšek, O. Švolík, GDPR v otázkách a odpovědích, 
“Buletin Advokacie”, 3.11.2017, http://www.bulletin-advokacie.cz/gdpr-v-otazkach-a-odpove-
dich (accessed 31.10.2018).
101 Th e UOOU warns that the recording of such a call and other related work with it is always 
the processing of the personal data of the employees of the call center and if the caller can be 
identifi ed, then also of the company’s client. It acknowledges that such processing may have 
a legitimate purpose consisitng in performance or change of contract, improvement of customer 
service etc. See UOOU Opinion No. 5/2013. 
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the employer is authorized to check the numbers dialed and the time spent handling 
out-of-work calls. As long as he does not try to detect the contents of the calls, there 
is no interference with the privacy of employees.102 An employee’s consent to the 
monitoring of his telephone activities is legally irrelevant. Preliminary information 
to employees that compliance with the ban on use of company phones for private 
purposes can be checked, is unanimously recommended by the literature since any 
case of more extensive and systematic monitoring of phone calls may fall under both 
Section 316 (2) LC and personal data protection.
Th e use of spyware, keyloggers and other high-tech means in the workplace would 
be, for reasons that have now been repeated several times, mostly very inappropriate 
and therefore unlawful. Th ese high-tech means represent a far more systematic and 
less controllable invasion into employee privacy and their personal data than most 
of the above-mentioned methods and devices.103 However, even here, the legal 
literature does not exclude exceptional cases where the protection of extraordinary 
know-how, the prevention of increased health and safety risks (i.e. access and work 
with a sensitive database, access and use of a particularly hazardous equipment) 
may justify protection against unauthorized entry and dangerous manipulation by 
an instantaneous identifi cation of users and their following of a standard operating 
procedure. Preventive measures focusing on the employer’s assets, not on the 
employees at work, should always be preferred and all deployed measures should be 
communicated to all the employees concerned.104
10. Conclusion
Czech law on the protection of privacy of employees in the workplace, as well as 
the authorities applying it, are principally in line with generally accepted European 
standards. Th ere is no doubt that the employee in the workplace has the right to 
privacy and that the content, extent and degree of protection of this fundamental 
right are understood and protected in the Czech Republic in accordance with 
the ECtHR. However, this basic consensus on values, and their substantive and 
procedural legal safeguards, does not mean that Czech law currently answers all 
questions and leads employers safely outside the restricted zone of prohibited ways of 
employee monitoring. 
Possible ways of using high-tech devices in the control and monitoring of 
employees are regulated in the Czech Republic, in particular, by a general regulation 
102 Judgment of the Supreme Court on the case 21 Cdo 747/2013 (7.08.2014). 
103 P.  Mališ, Právní aspekty používání keyloggerů, “PrávoIT.Cz”, 9.12.2008, http://www.pravoit.cz/
novinka/pravni-aspekty-pouzivani-keyloggeru (accessed 31.10.2018). 
104 See for instance M. Štefk o, K problému sledování vlastních zaměstnanců, “Právo a zaměstnání” 
2005, No. 1.
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of labor law. Th e privacy in the workplace issue enjoys the vivid attention of 
commentators and the case law of the highest judicial courts is also growing year 
aft er year. In general, however, the statutory provisions remain rather unclear, legal 
advisors sometimes contradict each other and even state authorities do not always 
provide entirely consistent guidance. Overall, an employer without legal education 
may fi nd it diffi  cult to stay on the safe side when he gets into more sophisticated 
monitoring of his employees. 
Th e analysis has shown the main causes of these uncertainties. In addition to the 
duality of legal regulations aff ecting workplace monitoring – the Labor Code and the 
data protection rules – it is primarily the wording of the key Section 316 LC. Certain 
tracking measures will interfere with the privacy of employees, but not always with 
the processing of their personal data and vice versa; employee data can be retrieved 
and processed without interfering with their privacy – which does not mean that 
those data are not protected. Adoption of one common lex specialis defi ning the 
employer’s duties in the fi eld of employee monitoring and data collection is no longer 
possible because its application would have directly replaced the existing GDPR, i.e. 
a directly applicable piece of EU legislation enjoying precedence over any national 
rule.
On the contrary, the refi nement of Section 316 LC would be desirable and is 
entirely within the purview of the Czech legislator. To emphasize the diff erence 
between paragraph 1 and paragraphs 2-3, not to repeat the same terms referring 
to the employer’s control, to underline that acting consistently within the limits of 
Section 316 (1) LC does not imply an interference with employee privacy (and thus 
no encroachment upon fundamental rights), whereas falling under Section 316 (2-3) 
LC already means interference, as well as to determine more clearly whether covert 
monitoring is possible and when advanced information about employee control is 
strictly required; all these amendments would remove a great deal of uncertainty on 
the part of employers. However, even the most sophisticated law cannot precisely 
set the limits of proportionality once and for all, cannot list all grounds justifying 
employee monitoring, etc. Th ere would always be the necessity to await judgments in 
cases that are not factually exclusive and permit to formulate general standards and 
set more precisely the boundaries between legal and illegal monitoring.
Czech courts have already provided such practical guidelines for cases of 
monitoring employees’ work on PCs, their e-mail communications and telephone 
calls. Courts took a clearly negative stance in several of the above-cited cases towards 
deployment of cameras that tracked employees for the whole or most of their working 
hours. Along with this jurisprudence, as well as with decisions of the ECtHR, the 
Czech administrative authorities (UOOU and SUIP) and Czech commentary 
literature, outlined some boundaries between prohibited and conditionally allowed 
acts of employers. However, the examples given in soft  law and Czech lawyers’ articles 
naturally point to cases of obviously exaggerated and therefore forbidden monitoring, 
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or on the contrary to well-justifi ed cases of employee control which would be logically 
and legally diffi  cult to challenge. For employers in the fi eld, which is not exceptional 
by extraordinary risks, by unique know-how or, at least, by numerous operations 
with high fi nancial amounts, the boundary of conditionally permitted monitoring 
still remains - a bit unclear.
Czech employers may thus lament that there is still a lack of clarity and perhaps 
legal certainty on the issue, nevertheless, certain recommendations they should 
follow are suffi  ciently obvious. Th ey can also be considered as a brief summary of the 
case law and the opinions of administrative bodies analyzed above. 
Interference with employee privacy can never be justifi ed by the protection of 
employer’s property in general, under any circumstances, or by the need to monitor 
and evaluate the performance of employees. Certain restrictions on the fundamental 
right to privacy are permissible only if justifi ed by the need for a higher level of 
protection (or higher risk of threat) of other legally protected rights and interests. 
Clear prohibitions and preventive measures to avoid breaching the rules of the 
workplace (by restricting employee access to certain devices, websites, etc.) are always 
more appropriate than monitoring what the employees actually do with particular 
devices or equipment. 
Targeted, time-limited tracking, justifi ed by the employer’s previous negative 
experiences or reasoned suspicion, is always more appropriate than a comprehensive, 
long-term, and only prevention-focused monitoring of employees at work. To focus 
the tracking device on an equipment, car, cash desk etc. is generally more acceptable 
than targeting the employees in person and their movement at the workplace. 
Preliminary information that monitoring can be used, how it will be handled and 
controlled and who will be responsible for it, is always a more appropriate and 
secure way of proceeding than any employer’s attempt to acquire information about 
employee’s behavior secretly. 
Finally, yet importantly, even measures that meet the stated recommendations 
must pass the proportionality test, i.e. to demonstrate their suitability and necessity 
to achieve legitimate purpose and compatibility with maintaining of the minimum 
necessary employee privacy in the workplace. Although grossly disproportionate 
measures are apparent from the above-mentioned recommendations quite clearly, 
where precisely the boundary between proportional and non-proportional is situated 
in a specifi c case, will always remain diffi  cult to tell in advance.
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